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PERPETUI TIES .
The term perpetuity is applied to an illegal sus-
pension of the power of alienation, or to grants of prop-
erty wherein the vesting of an estate or interest is
unlawfully postponed. The doctrine of perpetuities, as it
is called, is one of the most intricate and unsettled
branches of the law. It is a cantena of judicial decis-
ions upon the many attempts to so convey property that per-
sons may have the beneficial enjoyment of it without being
able to convey it away, or subject it to the claims of
their creditors.
These attempts have been ingenious and subtl9 but
the courts, and in modern times,the Legislature, have been
prompt to detect and to defeat all such attempts, and to
allow the power of alienation to be suspended only for a
limited period. Nevertheless, even in recent times,
scarcely a case involving the construction of a will
arises for judicial determination, in which the question of
illegal suspension is not involved; and it is often diffi-
cult to tell when the power of alienation is suspended.
In the Duke of Norfolk's Case, ( 3 Ch. Cases, 19)
the judge said:- "The power of alienation is suspended,
where, though all who have interest should join in the
conveyance, yet they could not bar or pass the estate.'
This definition has been substantially adopted in the Rev-
ised Statutes.
The attempt by the great Nobles and Lords of early
Englandto have their lands descend to their heirs, unin-
terrupted by and regardless of the rights of the Crown,
and of creditors and others, and the resistance of this
attempt by the courts, is an interesting conflict in the
study of this subject. The first attempt was by a limita-
tion , whereby a fee was restrained to some particular
heirs of a person exclusive of others. But this attempt
to create a perpetuity was immediately thwarted by the
judges, who by a subtle line of reasoningheld that such a
gift was a gift upon condition; that it should revert to
the donor, if the donee had no heirs of his body. They,
therefore, called it a fee simple on conditiontthat he
had issue; and observed that when any condition was per-
formed, it was thenceforth entirely gong and the thing to
which it was before annexed became absolute, and wholly
unconditional, so that when the grantee had issue, his es-
tate was supposed to become absolute by the performance of
the condition, and he might then alien his land, and , there-
fore the power of alienation was suspended only during the
life of one person in being at the longest.
The next attempt was by act of Parliament, the
statute of Westrinister the Second, ( commonly called the
statute 'de donis conditionabilis') which paid a greater r--
gard to the will and to the intentions of the donor than
to the propriety of such intentions, and enacted that
from thenceforth the will of the donor be observed; and
that the tenements so given ( to a man and the heirs of
his body) should at all events go to the issue if there
were any; or if none, should revert to the donor.
M.Iany and great inconveniences arose because of the
suspension of the power of alienation allowed by this stat-
ute. Bacon, Coke and Littleton have condemned the acl,
and declared that the true policy of the conmion law was
thereby overthrown; but the people were powerless to
effect an appeal, and the judges, while abhoring the per-
petuity thus created, were incapable of devising any sub-
terfuge, and about two centuries later in the reign of
Edward 1V. ( Taltarums case Co. Litt. 19b ) by a bold and
unexampled stretch of the power of judicial legislation,
the judges openly declared the application of a common re-
to
covery to be a sufficient bar~an estate tail, and their
determined attacks soon rendered the statute null e The
wise policy and foresight of the early judges in prevent-
all such attempts is borne out even at the present day.
Estates tail were introduced in this country with
the other parts of the English jurisprudence; and Kent
states that they subsisted in full force before our Rev-
olution, subject equally to the power of being barred by a
fine or a common recovery. In New York estates tail were
abolished by statute as early as 1782.
The history of executory devises presents an inter-
esting view of the stable policy of the cox,,non law judges
who abhorred perpetuities. The statute of entails having
been evaded by means of common recoveries,; and provisions
and conditions not to alien, with a cesser of the estate
on any such attempt by the tenant, having been declared
invalid as a means to recall perpetuities; the judges look-
ed upon executory limitations as a resort to attain the
same object, and they were permitted with great caution.
In the case of Pells v. Brown, ( Cro. Jac. 590.) an
executory devise of the fee upon a contingency not exceed-
ing one life was allowec,,and it was held that it could
not be barred by a recovery, but was silent as to execu-
tory bequests of chattels. The limits of an executory
devise were gradually enlarged, however, and extended to
any number of lives in being; then to any number of lives
in being and the period of gestation to reach a posthu-
mous child; and lastly the doctrine was finplly settled
and determined by precise limits and the period of
twenty one years to lives in being, and the period of ges-
tation was held allowable and also applicable to a chattel
intlerest.
The rule against perpetuities did not apply to the
creation of remainders. The onljr ioestriction imposed upon
the limitation of a contingent remainder at comnon law is
that there can be no limitation to the unborn child of
an unborn person. A contingent remainder could at any tini.
be destroyed by the tenant of the particular estate by a
finz or recovery in case of an estate tail, or by feoff-
ment or fine in the case of an estate for life; and there-
fore the poi-er of alienation was not suspended according
to the weight of authority.
By the rules of the ancient conmon law there could
be no future property to take place in expectancy, created
in personal goods and chattels, because it was thought
that personal property was of &oo transitory a nature, and
liable to loss and destruction , and also that the exigen-
cy of trade required its free circulation, as otherwise it
would put a stop to the freedom of gominerce. But an ex-
ception was made in the case of last wills and testaments;
for a man might by testamentary gift give the use of per-
sonal property to a man for life, and after his death to
a third person absolutely. But later this distinction was
disregarded, and a person might create such a remainder
by either deed or will. where an estate tail in things
personal was given to the first,or any subsequent possessor
it vests in-him the total property,and no remainder over
was permitted on such a limitation; for the judges were
ever watchful of an attempt to suspend the power of
alienation, and condemned this as tending to a perpetuity
as the devisee or grantee in tail of a chattel has no
method of barring the entail, and therefore the law vested
in him at once the entire dominion of the goods.
The rules against perpetuities put, as we see, a
limit upon the postponement of the vesting of property;
but it did no more, therefore, it was competent for a
testator to create a trust for the accumulation of the
income of properyfor the full period of any namber of
lives in beingand twenty one years thereafter, as was done
in the celebrated case of Thelluson v. Woodford, ( 4 Vessey
247 ) Here the will of Thelluson arose for construction
He had devised the bulk of his imnense property to trus-
tees for the purpose of accumulation during the lived of
his three sons , and of all their sons who should be living
at the time of his death, or be born in due time after-
wards, and during the life of the suvivor of them, and
upon t he death of this last to go,to the eldest male lin.
eal descendant of his three sons etc.. The court held that
this will was valid under the rules applicable to execu-
tory devises. This decision occasioned the passage of a
statute( 39 & 40 Geo. lll.)prohibiting any settlement of
property for accumulation of property for any longer term
than thu life of the settler and the period of twenty one
years from his death; or the minority of any living , or
en ventre sa mere at the time of his death; or the minor-
ity o' any person who would be beneficially entitled to
the profits under the settlement if of full age.
Other schemes to create perpetuities were devised,
as by an executor: trust "1irecting estates for life to
unborn children, to be so constituted as to make them ten-
ants for life, and to let in the issue to take as purchas-
ers;1 Humberston v. id. 1 P. Will. 322.) and by a power
of revocation, to be excercised upon the birth of each ten
ant in tail, and to substitute strict settlement; (Spencer
v. Duke of M., 5 Bro. P. C. 592.) These and many other
attempts to numerous to mention arose for judicial inves-k
tigation and were crushed by the judges.
The only case in which a perpetuity could be suc-
cessfully created at comon law was by establishing a
trust for a charitable purpose. Such trusts, if they did
not originate in the statute of 43 Elizabeth, were at
least assured and regulated by it. These trusts , althoujh
they do tend to a pecpetuity, are allow7able in England;*
the present day.
Having shown the application and extent of the rule
against perpetuities at common law, I will now examine the
present New York law upon this subject. In New York the
rule against the suspension of the power of alienation is
more stringent than at common law or in most of the States.
The general fundamental rule in regard to real es-
tate is, that the absolute power of alienation shall not
be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever for
a longer period than during the continuance of not
moru than two lives inbeing at the creation of the estate,
with one exception ; where a contingent remainder infee
may be created on a prior remainder in fee
to take effect in the event that the persons to whom the
first remainder is limited shall die under the age of
twenty one ,or upon any other contingency by which the
estate of such persons may be determined before they
attain their full age. A suspension of the absolute
power of alienation for a certain term not measured by
lives however short is void , as until my youngest daugh-
ter is twenty five , or for three years . But it was held
in Benedict v. Webb , ( 98 N.Y., 460.) that a suspension
for a minority is a suspension for one statuory life.
The absolute power of alienation is suspended
where there are no persons in being by whom an absolute
fee in possession can be conveyed; that is , there must
be :persons in being who by combining the several
estates , rights, interests or contingencies that they
represent can, if they all wish to, patch together an
absolute fee. Whenever any future estate , right, intere-
st or possibility can be released and thus extinguished,
its existance does not operate to suspend the absolute
power of alienation ; but the statute is not aimed at a
case where a person is incapable of alienating because of
infancy, lunacy etc.
In contingent estates,where the uncertainty is as
to the persons who are to take, there is obviously a sus-
pension of the power of alienation; but where tie uncertain
ty is as to the event and the personswho if the contin-
gency happens Will take are in esse and ascertainable the
estate is alienable, for these persons, and the owner of
the particular estate may comvey to a common grantee who
would receice an absolute fee . As for instance if an
estatebe givento A for life with renainder to " in fee pro-
vided he has children living at 6's death, but if he does
not then to C . Here there is a contingent remainder in R
depending on an uncertainty as to, an event yet the abso-
lute power of alienation is not suspended as B and f" may
assign their interest to A, who may then convey an abso-
lute fee. The court , however, are careless in constantly
stating that where the future estate is contingent the pow
er of alienation is suspended, which is not correct in every
case as has been shown, nevertheless they apply the real
test of alienability above given to the facts of each case
as it arises without consi ering whether it is contingent
or not and no harm is done.
The delivery of the grant, where an expectant es-
tate is created by grant, and where it is created by devise
the death of the testator, is deemed the time of the crea-
tion of the estate; and the instrument creating the estate
must be drawn, so that the suspension must inevitably ter-
minate within the statutory period. It is not enough that
the provisions of a given instrument are such that the sus-
pension may terminate within the requirements of the stat-
ute. Moreover, i f the terms are such as to indicate a
suspension for more than two lives in being, still, if
under all of the circumstances of the case, the absolute
fee must become alienable within two lives in being, it is
valid. As for instance, where a testator devised certain
land to his wife, arid her heirs in trust, to receive the
rents and profits t6 apply them to the use of, or pay to,
each of his seven children, in equal portions, during their
respective lives. In this case there would seem to be an
unlawful suspension, but there is riot; because, if the
cestui que trust survive the trustee, the whole estate be-
ing inalienable during her life, on her death must vest
in the cestui que trust by descent as her heirs at law
and as a person cannot be trustee for himself, the trust
must then cease. A merger results, and the estate is in-
alienable only during her life.
The exception to the rule,that the power of alien-
ation shall not be suspended for more than two lives in
needs
being, is simple and/little explanation. It applies to
cases
allAwhere there is allready a remainder in fee, limited to
an infant or person not in being, arid it says, in effect,
that regardless of.whether that remainder may itself con-
tinue contingenttill the end of the two lives or riot, in
either case a future and contingent remainder may be limi-
ted to vest, in case of the termination of the prior remain
der in fee during the minority of its owner.
In the case of all other contingent remainders, it
is necessary , under the provisions regulating the crea-
tion of remainders, that they must vest in interest during
the continuance of nct more than two lives in being. The
term vested in interest is a wider term than absolute
alienability, ard indicates a present fixed right of future
enj oyment.
Where land is given in undivided shares to two or
more persons as tenants in common for life, with cross re-
mainders, they constitute successive estates fur life
and consequently there can be under the statute but two
life estates in all, as to each parcel or share. Thus
where there is a gift to A and B as tenants in common for
life, with cross remainders, and after the death of both
to C for life , and then with a remainder in fee to such
children as C might leave: one of the shares is void, both
as to the remainder for life toC and the remainder over;
but it cannot be ascertained which one it is until the
death of A or B. If A and B had been joint tenants with a
like remainder, it would have been valid; as there is no
such thing as a remainder among joint tenants, for each is
in legal contemplation at all times seized of the entire
estate.
The statutory period allowed for suspension of abso-
lute ownership of personal property is in all cases two
lives in being. In all other respects limitations of fu-
ture contingent interests in personal property are governed
by the rules prescribed in relation to future estates in
land. But while real property must become absolutely
alienable, the provisions in regard to personalty require
vesting in beneficial owners. So long as the right to per-
sonal property remains contingent, the ownership cannot be
said to be absolute; as soon, however, as it vests abso-
lutely, suspension of the absolute ownership ceases.
Where personal property is given by will, or other-
wise, with restrictions which delay merely the right to
possession, the absolu te ownership is not suspended: as
where a fund is given to A for life, with remainder to B,
C and D in equal shares to be paid them by the executors
ten years after A's death, the interest to be paid to them
in the mean time. The property vests in them as a present
gift. The right of the executor or trustee to retain it is
regarded as a power which does riot interfere with vesting the
absolute ownership, or with the owners free right to assign
or release. But where a present gift is not intended, the
vesting is postponed: as where a will provides for a
future division among the persons who shall then answer the
a given description. The question in each case is, did
the testator intend a present gift? and if he did riot, the
vesting must take place within two lives in being.
The law against the suspension of alienationof real
or personal property is applicable to ever species of
conveyance and limitation: whether it be by deed or will;
whether limited by an executory devise, or a springing
use , or for a charitable purpose;ad whether in the form
of a power in trust, or of a legal express trust.
In determining whether the power of alienation is
suspended, where a trust is created , the same rules which
have been heretofore considered. In New York express trust
cart only be created for such purposes as are allowable by
statute. Under the first two sections of the provisions
of the Revised Statutes specifying such purpose,they may
be created: to sell lands for the benefit of creditors,
and to sell, mortgage or lease lands for the benefit of
legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge
thereon * In such trusts where the direction is to sell
the land, there is obviously no suspension of the power of
alienation; as the only purpose for which they could be
created would necessitate an immediate sale. But where
the direction is to mortgage or lease lands, it is not so
clear; and it is sometimes difficult to tell whether the
trust comes under the second or third section. if it comes
under the second, the interest of the beneficiary is
assign ablq and the power of alienation is not suspended.
Under the third section, trusts may be created:"To
receive the rents and profits of land and apply them to
the use of any person auring the life of such person, or
for any shorter term, subject to the rules prescribed in
the first article of this title.* It is further provided
in the statute of uses and trusts, that where the trust
is or shall be expressed in the instrument creating the es-
tate, every sale or conveyance by the trustee in contra-
vention of the trust shall be void; and that a benefic-
iary for the receipt of rents and profits cannot assign
or dispose of such interest. Therefore, the statute makes
the estate inalienable, and also expressly subject to the
rules against suspension. So it becomes very necessary to
determine whether a trust comes under the second or third
section, and the courts have decided that where a trustee
is directed to receive the rents and profits and apply or
pay them over, such trust belongs to the third class,
but where he is directed to pay a specific sum of money
assuch, and riot as rents and profits, the trust belongs to
the second class.
And now as to the fourth and last purpose for which
trusts can be created: that is, I To receive the re its and
profits of land and to accumulate the same for the purpose,
and within the limits prescribed in the first article of
this act." Article first provides in substance, that accu-
mulations may be made for the benefit of one or more minors
then in being, and terminate with their minority If the
accumulation is to commence at any time after the creation
of the estate out of which the rents and profits are to
arise; it shall commence within two lives in being, and dbririg
the minority of the persons for whose benefit it is direct-
ed, and shall terminate at the expiration of such minor-
ity.
There is an important distinction between accumula-
tions of real and personal property, here to be noted. In
the case of real property, accumulations for the benefit of
an unborn child may be directed to commence at the end of
two lives in being, at the birth of such child and extend
through his minority; but in the case of personal prop-
erty , it must commence before the expiration of the second
life, otherwise the provisions are the same. ( Manicev.
Manice, 43 N. Y. 383. )
Every accumulatiom must be for the sole benefit
an i :ant and where it is for the purpose of paying a lump
sum legacy the power of alienation is not suspended,
nevertheless, where the accumulation is to commence after
the creation of the estate, alienation may be suspended
and the mileE already considered are to be applied in de-
ternini i ig its validity.
I will now consider the rules against perpetuitics,
as applied to powers. It seems an anomaly to say , that
the power of alienation may be suspended by the creation
of a power, for if there is in fact a power in any body to
sell the property, it cannot be said that the power of
alierition is wanting, nevertheless, such may be the case
where the power cannot be excercised mntil the expiration
of a certain time. If the power can be exercised only at
a time beyond that within which all limitations must take effect
in possession , namely, two lives in beimg, the power is
void; so also if the power is special, and the appointment
is limited to a person or to persons none of whom can take
from being to remote under the rule, thus the power to
appoint among great- grandchildren of the testator. ( Dana
v. Murray, 122 N. Y. 613.)
Not only may the power of alienation be suspended
where there is a power to sell land at a future day and
pay over the proceeds to pers~ns,who,cannot till then be
ascertaind ; but also where the direction is to pay the
proceeds to a trustee.
If a trust is created which involves suspension,and
a power is given to the trustee to sell the land and there-
by entirely free the proceeds from the operation of the
execution of the trust, the existence of the power must
obviate any suspension of the power of alienation,; but
if the proceeds of such sale are to remain subject to
the execution of the trust, then alienation id sus-
pended. ( Brewer v. Brewer, 11 Hun, 147.)
The period during which the absolute power of alien-
ation may be suspended by any instrument in execution of
a power is computed, not from the date of such instrument,
but from the time of the creation of the power.
Wffhere the execution of a power in trust to sell
real estate is unlimited as to time, it is not for that
reason invalid; the mere possibility of an illegal appoint-
ment will not invalidate the power if it is in the end
properly exercised. The rules governing the creation of
powers in real property are to be applied so far as applic-
able to po'ters concerning personal property, keeping in
nAnd, however, the distinction already considered between
suspension of power of alienation, and of absolute owner-
ship. ( Hutton v. Benkard, 92 N. Y. 295.)
The earlier deci sions of this State tended towards
holding perpetual trusts for charitable purposes valid.
The leading case was that of Williams v. Williams, ( 4 Sel'
484.)where it was held that the rule against perpetuitdes
in New York did not apply to gifts for a charitable pur-
pose, Here the issue was as to the validity of a bequest
to three persons, by name, directing the application of th_
fund to the education of the children of the poor in Hun-
tington at the academy in that village. It also contained
provisions for perserving a succession of trustees to
apply the fund, and was upheld as valid. The decision did
not meet with favor from the courts, and was continually
distinguished, critized, and finally overruled in the case
of Bascomb v. Albertson, (34 N. Y. 584.) The court ,
after a most careful and exaustive research, decided that a
gift to a charitable use was subject to the rules against
perpetuities, and that in determining whether the viceof
perpetuity attaches, it is of no significance whatever
that the limitations are to what are anderstood as char-
itable objects.
It has been the policy of this State, nevertheless,
to encourage gifts and legacies to legally incorporated so-
cieties organized for charitable purposes; but the law
has thrown around such institutions necessary and healthful
restrictions upon their taking and holding property a
devise to a corporation is prohibited except in cases wher,_
by the law of its creation or some other la: of the State
the particular corporation is authorized to take by devise,
and corporations can only take and hold property to the
amounts an d for the purposes prescribed by their charters;
( in favor
to this extent each act of incorporation is a dispensation
of the particular corporation in respect to the prohibition
of the statutes against perpetuities.
I have refrained from going into this subject more
in detail as I regard a clear precise presentation as more
e
benficial and important than a more minute and voluminous
disquisition,and indeedthis is rendered unnecessary as the
so called doctrine of perpetuities is no longer an uncer-
tain metaphysical policy, the fundamental principles being
governed by postive legislation. Most of the difficulties
of the present day are in determining intention, and .-hen
this is once fixed upon, the application of the ri-es be-
comes -omparatively easy.

